Researching the Process of Acceptance of Resolution 598 by Imam Khomeini (RA)

One of the most mysterious aspects of the history of the war is the issue of the acceptance of Resolution 598, which after more than three decades, we are still faced with the paucity of solid and analytical works in this regard. According to the Imam, the decision to accept the resolution was based on a series of "incidents and factors" that have been postponed to the future for research analysis, and it seems that now is the time to decipher this historical decision. Recognizing the macro political decision-making process will be effective in preventing the repetition of some difficult and sometimes bitter decisions.
The consensus of high-ranking political and military officials is one of the matters that played a decisive role in the process of decision-making and the initial change of the Imam's opinion, at two decisive historical moments after the conquest of Khorramshahr and the acceptance of the resolution, and in a way, it included the Islamic and intellectual justification for the Imam's final decision. Is. The question is, what happened during the short tenure of the Deputy Commander of the General Forces between June 2, 1988 and July 18, 1988, that made the Imam reconsider his decisive decision to end the war?
So far, politicians and analysts have proposed various possibilities regarding the reasons for the adoption of the resolution, including the direct entry of the United States into the war, lack of liquidity, the imbalance of strategic weapons, the change in the officials' beliefs regarding the importance and priority of the war, and people's discouragement from participating in the war. Front and other factors pointed out that in this article, the negation of these factors will be discussed as the main reason for accepting the resolution.
This research is among the causal researches and it was done with descriptive analytical approach and its data was collected by library method. In this article, based on historical documents and evidence, while re-examining the role of consensus-building factors to impose the poison cup, some contexts and social political roots of the Imam's decision to accept the resolution have been re-read and examined. The field of governance has abandoned its initial view of the continuation of the war until the regrettable defeat of the Baathist regime, and with the consensus of the political and military trustees, it has recognized the interest of the people and the Islamic system in accepting the resolution.