نوع مقاله : تاریخ معاصر ایران
نویسندگان
دانشکده حقوق و علوم سیاسی. دانشگاه تهران. تهران.ایران
چکیده
کلیدواژهها
عنوان مقاله [English]
نویسندگان [English]
Despite two decades of focused efforts by the Pahlavi I government to institutionalize a modern state, its hasty collapse in September 1941 and the crisis of the Autonomous Government of Azerbaijan in 1945 highlight a fundamental contradiction in the contemporary Iranian state-building process. The objective of this research is to explore the question of what the nature of the Pahlavi I state-building mechanisms in Azerbaijan was and how they contributed to creating the internal grounds for the aforementioned crisis. This study, adopting a qualitative approach and descriptive-analytical method, is based on archival and historical documents from the Pahlavi I era in Azerbaijan. The statistical population encompasses the collection of documents from this period, with sampling conducted through purposive and theoretical methods. Data analysis, utilizing historical content analysis and conceptual inference, is framed within the theories of "political development" and "state-nation building," relying on the concept of "social sources of power" by Michael Mann. The findings indicate that the Pahlavi I army, as the main axis of the new order, advanced an authoritarian project in which "despotic power" (coercive suppression) prevailed over "infrastructural power" (legitimate social penetration). Policies such as the implementation of compulsory military service, the settlement of nomads (Takht-e Qapu), and coercive cultural engineering failed to sustainably resolve the crises of penetration and identity. As a result, this authoritarian state-building model, by provoking latent resistances, created an unstable legacy that facilitated the internal grounds for the 1945 crisis and demonstrated that the roots of the crisis, beyond external factors, stem from structural weaknesses in the coercive development model.
کلیدواژهها [English]
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